The empirical literature has documented a weakening of the consumption and output responses to an increase in government spending during the last thirty years. We show that a New-Keynesian model in which real government spending is observed with measurement errors can account for the reduction in the size of government spending multipliers. The model implies -consistent with empirical evidence presented by Ilzeki et al., 2009,-that the evolution of monetary policy and greater globalization (increasing international trade and decreasing capital controls) are key factors in this development.
Introduction
The response of consumption to an unanticipated increase in government spending has weakened over the last thirty years in most OECD countries, and output multipliers have also fallen. Perotti (2004) , Perotti and Monacelli (2006) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) , show that there was a structural break around 1980 in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Canada, and Australia. Pre-1980 , the response of consumption was positive, while post-1980 it is near zero.
Similarly, pre-1980 output multipliers were positive, and, at least in the U.S., greater than one; post-1980, they are near zero. As far as we are aware, there has been no rigorous attempt to model the evolution of government spending multipliers and to identify the factors that were important in their withering. That is our objective in this paper.
More specifically, we build a NOEM model and study two calibrations of it: one to pre-1980 (Canadian) data and the other to post-1980 data. These two calibrations are able to explain the observed evolution of consumption responses and output multipliers. Our model suggests that the most important factor was the evolution of monetary policy, in which the stabilization of exchange rates gave way to a standard Taylor Rule. 1 Globalization (in the form of increased openness, and to a lesser extent, the relaxation of capital controls) also played a role. Luck (in the form of a more stable government spending process) was not an important factor. 2 Our findings concerning the role played by monetary policy (exchange rate regime) and the degree of openness fit well the empirical evidence presented by Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2009). 3 As is well known, it is difficult to build a (so called) New-Keynesian model in which households increase their consumption in response to an unanticipated increase in government spending.
The old Keynesian notion was that disaggregated households increased their spending in response to the income generated by the increased spending of others; this sequential process led to what became know as the Keynesian multiplier. In modern DSGE models, assumptions about consumption risk sharing lead to a representative consumer, and this representative consumer sees the increase in government spending as a tax liability, or a decrease in permanent income;
1 There is a well documented change in monetary policies that began around 1980 in most OECD countries. The demise of the Bretton Woods system occurred somewhat earlier. The Canada/US exchange rate appears to have gotten more volatile around 1977 (the standard deviation of quarterly percentage changes in the sample is about three times larger than in the 1960-1976 sample). Since the literature on government spending multipliers puts the break at 1980, and the literature on monetary policy also puts the break at 1980, we have chosen that date for our break in our two calibrations of the model.
2 Parallel to the moderation of the effects of fiscal policy, there has been a widely documented moderation in the severity of the business cycle. Whether the fiscal moderation has contributed significantly to the total moderation or not remains an open issue. Fiscal shocks are rather unimportant for business cycles in the NK model. 3 In particular Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh find that the degree of exchange rate flexibility is a critical determinant of the size of fiscal multipliers. Economies operating under predetermined exchange rate regimes have positive multipliers but economies with flexible exchange rate regimes have essentially zero multipliers. They also find that the degree of trade openness is also an important determinant.
the representative consumer wants to work more and consume less. This response is counter factual, at least for the pre-1980 period, and indeed, we find that our model cannot explain the evolution of output multipliers unless something is added to get around this negative wealth effect.
The most popular way of getting around the negative wealth effect is to model rule of thumb households -households that, for one reason or another, simply consume their current disposable income. This idea may be reminiscent of earlier Keynesian notions, but in calibration exercises, a very large fraction of total consumption must be attributed to the rule of thumbers if this kind of modeling is to fit the data. 4 We have chosen a different approach. 5 It seems plausible to assume that households and firms have imperfect information about macroeconomic (and possibly microeconomic, or idiosyncratic) shocks. They see their income rising, following an unanticipated government spending shock, but they are not sure why. Their perceptions are confounded by the possibility of other shocks that would actually increase their permanent income. As will be seen, a rather small amount of noise in agents' observations 6 is sufficient in our calibrations to make household consumption (and investment 7 ) respond positively to the fiscal shock.
And indeed, imperfect information and learning provide the fulcrum in our model for a MundellFlemming effect that plays an important role in what follows. With imperfect information, a government spending shock increases consumption, and this increase in aggregate demand puts upward pressure on the relative price of home goods. In a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank must conduct expansionary open market operations to keep the nominal exchange rate from appreciating. This policy slows the rise in the relative price of home goods and keeps it from curbing the increase in aggregate demand; government spending multipliers are large.
In a flexible rate regime, the relative price of home goods rises faster, and the multipliers are diminished. This is a familiar story. But, the point here is that the Mundell-Flemming effect is never set in motion in a standard NOEM without imperfect information: consumption must rise following the increase in government spending if the flexibility of the exchange rate is to matter for output multipliers.
4 See for example Galí, López-Salido and Valles (2007) , Coenen and Straub (2005) , or Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) .
5 Recently, Perotti and Monacelli (2006) , Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) have suggested other explanations: non-separable utility and deep habits. It is too early to tell whether these alternative explanations will gain traction.
6 Using the Real Time Data Set of the Philadelphia FED for the US we establish that the measurement error in real government expenditure in the US is quite substantial. And that the amount of misperception in real public spending required by the model is considerably smaller than that present in real time releases of US public spending data.
7 In contrast to empirical work investigating the response of consumption, there is little work on the response of investment to government spending shocks. Fatas and Mihov, 2003 , find a weak but positive response.
A related observation is that a perfectly observed (or fully anticipated) increase in government spending will not increase consumption in our model, and this fact may be consistent with a different branch of the literature on government spending multipliers. The event study approach used by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and others typically finds that easily identified episodes of large increases in defense spending cause output to increase, but private consumption to fall.
Once again, imperfect information is required in our model if consumption is to rise in response to an increase in government spending.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we outline our model and our calibration of a pre-1980 benchmark and a post-1980 benchmark. In section 3, we show that the two benchmarks are able to explain the evolution of government spending multipliers (and the weakening of consumption responses) that has been observed in the data. Since the change in monetary policy plays an important role in the model's explanation of this evolution, we also calculate the multipliers under some other monetary policies -a fixed money growth rule and a strict inflation targeting rule. The money growth rule was the alternative to a fixed exchange rate regime in the Mundell-Flemming paradigm, and a strict inflation targeting rule may be the direction in which many central banks in the OECD are headed. Section 4 concludes with some caveats and directions for future research.
The Model
The model consists of a small domestic economy and a large foreign economy (or rest of the world). The domestic economy is characterized by monopolistic competition and Calvo price setting, competitive labor markets and flexible wage rates, endogenous capital accumulation, and imperfect information about macroeconomic shocks. The household's signal extraction problem causes its consumption to rise in response to an unanticipated increase in government spending.
Production of the domestic final good
The domestic final good, y, can be used for domestic consumption (private and public) or for investment. Competitive firms produce this final good by combining domestic (x d ) and foreign (x f ) goods. A CES aggregator describes their production function
where ω ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1).
Cost minimization by the final good producers implies the demand functions
where P xt and e t P xt denote the home currency price of the domestic and the foreign goods. The final good's price is
Competitive firms produce x t = x d,t + x d,t (and x t abroad) by combining domestic and foreign intermediate goods
where θ ∈ (−∞, 1). And again, cost minimization give the demand for intermediate goods
Likewise, the domestic demand for the foreign intermediate good i is given by
where
Production of the domestic intermediate goods
Each intermediate firm i, i ∈ (0, 1), uses a constant returns to scale technology
where k t (i) and h t (i) denote capital and labor. A t is an exogenous technology shock whose properties will be defined later. Households supply capital and labor competitively; the wage and rental rates, w t and r k,t , are flexible. Households also set the capital utilization rate, u t .
The firm determines its production plan by minimizing its real cost min
subject to (9). Minimized real total costs are then given by ψ t x t (i) where the real marginal cost, ψ t , is given by
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive, and therefore set prices for the good they produce. Following Calvo (1983) , in any given period, a firm gets to adjust its price optimally with probability γ. If the firm does not get this chance, then its price is automatically indexed to the steady state rate of inflation,π
A firm that does get to adjust will set its price at
where Φ t+τ is an appropriate discount factor derived from the household's optimality conditions.
Since the price setting scheme is independent of any firm specific characteristic, all firms that reset their prices will choose the same price.
In each period, a fraction γ of price contracts ends and a fraction (1 − γ) survives. Hence, from (4) and the price mechanism, the aggregate price of the domestic good becomes
The household
Household utility is
where c t denotes consumption of the final good, M t /P t is (end of period) real money balances held by the household, and h t is hours worked by the household; 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor, and b is a parameter that measures the degree of habit persistence in consumption.
The household's budget constraint is
where B d t and B f t are domestic and foreign currency bonds, and τ t is a lump sum tax used by the government to balance its budget each period. The foreigners do not hold domestic bonds;
is an adjustment cost on foreign bond holdings. i t is household investment, and k t is the amount of physical capital owned by the household and leased to the firms; u t is the household's choice of the capital utilization rate. Utilization of the capital gives rise to a utilization cost of z(u t )k t , where z(·) is a convex strictly increasing function, with z(u) = 0 and z (u)u/z (u) = σ z . Households own the domestic firms, and Π t are their profits. Finally, χ > 0 measures the strength of capital controls on the household's holdings of foreign assets.
Capital accumulates according to the law of motion
where δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the rate of depreciation. Capital accumulation is subject to increasing and convex investment adjustment costs satisfying Φ(1) = Φ (1) = 0 and Φ (1) = ϕ i > 0.
The household then maximizes (13) subject to (14)- (15). Its first order conditions are given in an appendix.
Monetary policy
We will generally characterize monetary policy by an interest rate rule of the form
where ∆e t is the rate of depreciation. However, we will also consider the case where the central bank follows a constant money growth rule, M t = (1 + g m )M t−1 .
The rest of the world
We model the foreign economy with an analogous, but stripped down, structure. Foreign demand for the domestic good is
where ζ ωt is a preference shock. We do not model investment in the foreign economy; so c t = y t .
Both y t and π t are modeled as exogenous AR (1) processes. Finally, an Euler equation determines the foreign interest rate, R t .
1.6 Imperfect information and the signal extraction problem Uncertainty (misperceptions) about the true level of real government spending plays a crucial role in our analysis. It enables the model to generate a positive response of consumption to a positive spending shock; and also to capture the size and evolution of multipliers during the last few decades. Before proceeding any further we need to convince the readers that, while information on real government spending is available with a short time lag (one or two quarters), it is ridden with substantial measurement error. To this purpose, and lacking suitable data for Canada, we will use the real time data set of the Philadelphia FED 9 to compute the measurement error in real US government spending. Given the nature of data collection and processing in the industrial countries, we speculate that the properties of measurement error in real public spending in Canada and the US are likely to be quite similar.
Let G t|t be the initial release of government spending of period t (first reported in vintage t+1) and g t|t = log G t|t − log G t−1|t its growth rate. Let G t|t+i (resp. g t|t+i = log G t|t+i − log G t−1|t+i ) be the revised figure for period t that is available in period t + i, i > 1. We use t + i = T to represent the "final" release. The measurement error in real government spending growth in period t is then µ t|T = g t|T − g t|t . Table 1 reports the properties (standard deviation and autocorrelation) of the measurement error in the growth of real spending. As can be see these errors are quite substantial 10 and do represent a good measure of unperceived real government spending. 13
Having established that real government spending contains a significant misperceived component, we now turn to the discussion of the informational setup of the model. With the exception of financial price variables, all aggregate variables tend to be observed with noise. For an imperfectly observed variable x we assume that
11 Note that Table 1 already indicates the absence of autocorrelation and hence of predictability based on own lagged values in µ t|T . But this is not sufficient to establish the lack of predictability as there may be other variables at the time of the release that could help forecast future government spending.
12 We have also considered additional variables whose values are available at the time of the release. The results remain the same.
13 These results are robust to the introduction of other variables -such as output growth-in the regression.
where x T t denotes the true value of the variable, x t is the value actually observed in period t and η t is a measurement error that satisfies E(η t ) = 0 for all t, E(η t ε a,t ) = E(η t ε g,t ) = E(η t ε µ,t ) = 0, and
Agents use the Kalman filter to update their beliefs about the state of the economy based on the history of observations {x t , x t−2 , ...} as well as their knowledge of the model. The solution is described in some detail in a technical appendix to Collard and Dellas (2006) .
There exist many possibilities and a great deal of arbitrariness in specifying the details of the signal extraction problem. This is because the variables are linked through the equations of the model and the size of the system (and hence the number of variables) can be arbitrarily reduced through successive substitutions (see Svensson and Woodford, 2003) . We estimate a non-constrained version of equation 19 -x t = α 0 + α 1 x T t + η t -for GDP and inflation in the US using the Philadelphia FED Real Time Data Set and test for the error in variable assumption. This test amounts to test the joint restriction α 0 = 0 and α 1 = 1. The results for the test are reported in the first column of the table. We then use the standard error of these regressions (reported in the second column) as our measure of σ 2 η for y (and y ) and π (and π ) respectively. Results for the whole period are reported in Table 3 . The error in variables test indicates that the null hypothesis that η t is indeed a mispecification error cannot be rejected on the data. The table also indicates that both output and inflation are both significantly affected by misspecification errors. Again the hope is that these numbers do not differ much from their Canadian counterparts.
Parametrization
We parameterize our model using quarterly We set the preference parameters at values that are commonly used in the Business Cycle literature. We set β, the discount factor, so that households discount the future at a 4% annual rate. We set σ m , the inverse of the elasticity of money demand, at 1.5. We let σ h , the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, be equal to 1. We set ν h so that households devotes 30% of their time to productive activities in the steady state. And finally, we set b, the habit persistence parameter, at 0.65.
On the supply side, we set θ so that there is a 20% price markup (over marginal cost) in the steady state. The technology parameter α is set so that the labor share is 0.58 in the steady state. We set σ z , the elasticity parameter in the capital utilization cost to 0.1. The Calvo parameter insures that firms reset their prices every 2.5 quarters on average.
We set ρ so that the elasticity of substitution between the foreign and domestic good is equal to 1.5. ω is then used to match the historical import shares during the two benchmark calibrations, 20% for the pre-1980 period, and 28%. for the post-1980 period. We set the corresponding parameter for the world economy at 0.99, implying that Canadian exports are 1% of the world economy's consumption. Based on Canadian and world GDP data, we assume that the world economy is about 30 times bigger than the Canadian economy. We follow Dib (2003) and set the parameter, χ, equal to 0.005 in the pre-1980 period; in the post-1980 period, we assume that it has dropped to 0.0025 to account for the relaxation of capital controls.
14 The data was taken from the OECD's main economic indicators. (1) process. Canadian data from the national accounts was linearly detrended, and then the process was estimated for the two sample periods.
We assume all shocks follow AR(1) processes. We also assume that the rest of the world can be approximated by the U.S. The processes for world output and world inflation were estimated using U.S. data. The (log of ) output was linearly detrended; then, the technology shock was estimated using Solow residuals. We built a capital series by iterating on investment (obtained from the national accounts). Then, using the employment and output data, we calculated a Solow residual and estimated the AR(1) process for technology. The preference shock was calibrated using U.S. demand for the Canadian good. As a consequence, x d , is identified as Canadian exports to the U.S. And, the U.S.-Canadian terms of trade appears in the world demand function for Canadian goods. Using the value for ρ and ω , we built a series for the preference shock and estimated an AR(1) process for it.
The Evolution of Government Spending Multipliers
Now, we are ready to see how our model would explain the evolution of government spending multipliers that has been observed in the data. It is instructive to begin with the special case of perfect information, then we will proceed to the more interesting case of imperfect information.
The (counter factual) case of perfect information
Here we assume that households and firms observe macroeconomic variables without error, and that there is therefore no signal extraction problem. Table 5 -1980) for consumption and investment fall under either calibration. And hours worked rise. This is a familiar result from the RBC literature. Households see the increase in government spending as tax liability that decreases their permanent income: they respond by working more, consuming less and investing less. In a sticky price setting the output multipliers are very small. Something must be done in order to counter this wealth effect on aggregate demand if the model is to explain the empirical observations.
As explained above, we have chosen to do this by adding imperfect information. From now on, we assume that households and firms have to base their decisions on imperfect signals about the macroeconomic shocks.
Imperfect information: Output multipliers in the benchmark calibrations
The first and last lines of Table 6 report the cumulative output multipliers for our two benchmark calibrations. In the Bfixed calibration, the first quarter multiplier is greater than one, and then the multipliers tapers off at the four and eight quarter horizons. In the Bflex calibration, the multipliers are dramatically smaller at all horizons. These model generated multipliers capture remarkably well the reduction in spending multipliers that accompanied the change in monetary policy practices. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, on the other hand, the reduction in inflation triggers a reduction in the interest rate, which acts to increase output. But because the expansion is limited (the decrease in inflation is modest), and more importantly, the monetary reaction to price developments is rather weak (recall that κ π = 1.3) the monetary expansion is modest, which limits the size of the increase in the multiplier relative to both the M-rule and the peg.
Note, though, that the fiscal multiplier would be much higher if the monetary authorities were strict inflation targeters 16 , see section 2.5.
Luck, a change in monetary policy, or globalization?
What are the factors that account for the rather dramatic fall in government spending multipliers? There are three candidates in our modeling. The first is luck: in the Bflex calibration, the stochastic process for government spending is less volatile. The second is monetary policy: in the Bflex calibration, the fixed rate regime yields to an estimated interest rate rule that places very little weight on exchange rate stabilization. And the third is globalization: in the Bflex calibration, capital controls (modeled as a cost of holding foreign assets) are relaxed, and the economy is more open to trade.
In Table 6 , we consider these factors one at a time. In the second line, we have replaced the fixed exchange rate regime with the estimated Taylor rule, but we have held all of the other parameters in the Bfixed calibration unchanged. In the third line, we have relaxed the capital controls, but we held all the other parameters unchanged. In the fourth and fifth lines, we similarly consider changes in openness and in the government spending process.
The change in monetary policy clearly makes the largest marginal contribution to the fall in There is, however, a major caveat here: the marginal contributions in Table 6 may be misleading indicators of how important the various factors might be. These factors interact with each other when they are combined, as in the Bflex calibration. The marginal contributions are not orthogonal to each other, and the cumulative effects of adding one factor after another depend upon the order in which they were added. Table 7 reports the cumulative marginal contributions that the factors make when they are added in a specific way. First, based on Table 6 , we selected the factor with the largest individual marginal contribution; this is the change in monetary policy. We imposed this change, and then we considered each of the other factors, one at a time. We selected the factor that, once again, made the largest marginal contribution. This led us to select openness. We continued the process, selecting looser capital controls, and then the more stable fiscal process.
Looking at either Table 6 or Table 7 , the change in monetary policy is clearly the most important factor in the model's explanation of the evolution of government spending multipliers. One of the globalization factors -openness -also seems to be important. Both of these findings are in line with the findings of Ilzeki et al., 2009 . Finally, easing capital controls is somewhat important, and luck seems quite unimportant.
How flexible rates and openness reduce the government spending multipliers
The IRFs in Figures 4 and 5 help explain the progression of multipliers in Table 7 . In Figure   4 , IRFs from the Bfixed calibration are compared to IRFs from a calibration in which the fixed exchange regime has been replaced by the estimated Taylor rule, and all other parameters are as in the Bfixed calibration; this corresponds to moving from line 1 to line 2 in Table 7 . In Figure   5 , the second set of IRFs from Figure 4 are compared to IRFs from a calibration in which we have both the Taylor rule and increased openness; this corresponds to moving from line 2 to line 3 in Table 7 .
In Figure 4 , the importance of flexible rates is readily apparent: the response of GDP to an unanticipated increase in government spending is much greater in the fixed rate regime. The reason for this is also readily apparent. With flexible rates, the nominal exchange rate would appreciate. Monetary policy must be loosened to counter this in the fixed rate regime. Real interest rates fall further than they would with the Taylor rule, and this causes both consumption and investment demand to rise more. And, of course, the fact that the exchange rate does not appreciate means that more of the increase in consumption falls on the domestic good. 17
In Figure 5 , the importance of openness is also apparent: the response of GDP is less when the import share is larger. When a larger import share of the increase in demand falls more on the foreign good, and aggregate demand for the domestic good rises less. With the Taylor rule, the appreciation in terms of trade is smaller and the fall in net exports is dampened.
Money targeting and strict inflation targeting
Since the change in monetary policy was shown to be the most important factor it the evolution of the model's multipliers, it may also be interesting to consider alternative specifications of monetary policy. Table 7 shows how the multipliers in the Bflex calibration would change if the estimated Taylor rule were replaced by a fixed money growth rule or a stricter inflation targeting 17 The terms of trade must appreciate with the Taylor rule for this "Mundell-Flemming" explanation to work. There is currently some debate about this in the empirical literature. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2006) find that the real exchange rate depreciates. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2003) and Chinn (1999) find that it appreciates, which is also the more conventional view. rule (where κ π = 3 and κ y = 0 in row (7) and κ π = ∞ and κ y = 0 in row (8)).
The money growth rule is interesting for conceptual reasons: it is the logical counter part to the fixed exchange rate regime in the "Mundell-Flemming" paradigm. The output multipliers are lower under the money growth rule than under the estimated Taylor rule or under the fixed exchange rate. This is due to the fact that the model generates a reduction in inflation and an appreciation in the nominal exchange rate under the money targeting rule. Under the Taylor rule, the monetary authorities react to the lower inflation by lowering interest rates, which stimulates the economy. Similarly loose policy must be followed under a peg in order to prevent the appreciation of the domestic currency.
The strict inflation targeting rule is interesting because it may be where central banks in the OECD countries are heading. As explained earlier, stricter inflation targeting gives a stronger response to the government spending shocks than does a standard Taylor rule. The stronger reaction of monetary policy to the reduction in inflation that would have occurred under passive money growth policy is behind this result.
Conclusion
We have shown that a New Keynesian model is capable of explaining the evolution of consumption responses and output multipliers that has been observed in the data when the model is augmented to include imperfect information about the shocks. Imperfect information's key contribution is to help the model overcome the negative wealth effect that normally decreases consumption in response to an increase in government spending. In our model, the response of consumption is positive.
We find that monetary policy's movement away from exchange rate stabilization, and to a standard Taylor Rule, is the most important factor in accounting for observed differences in spending multipliers. However, globalization (in the form of increased openness, and to a lesser extent, the relaxation of capital controls) also plays a role. Luck (in the form of a more stable government spending process) does not seem to be an important factor.
A The first order conditions of household's program i t :
where Λ t and q t denote the Lagrange multiplier to, respectively, (14) and (15). Note: R =Federal fund rate, ∆S&P = changes in the S&P stock market index, ∆Y = changes in GDP. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Note: R =Federal fund rate, ∆S&P = changes in the S&P stock market index, ∆Y = changes in GDP, π inflation rate (GDP Deflator). Standard deviations in parenthesis.
B Forecasting Regressions: Robustness

